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1. Introduction
At the core of microfounded, optimization-based macroeconomic models lies
an aggregate Euler equation relating aggregate output to real interest rates: the
Output Euler Equation (OEE in short). This equation (also known as ’the intertem-
poral IS curve’) takes, under a variety of preference specifications, the simple form:
(1.1)  = +1 +  [ −+1] + 
where  is output,  nominal interest rates, +1 expected inflation, and  an
’aggregate demand shock’; it origins in the intertemporal Euler equation describing
the asset-holding/investment decision of households combined with the aggregate
resource constraint of the economy. Correspondingly, the coeﬃcient  (the slope of
the OEE) is the negative of the ’aggregate elasticity of intertemporal substitution’, or
AEIS for short.1 Standard theory predicts that the coeﬃcient  is negative, because
an increase in interest rates leads the representative agent to substitute consumption
(output) today for consumption (output) tomorrow. This mechanism implies a
strong role for macroeconomic policy to influence the economy: monetary policy can
aﬀect aggregate demand by manipulating nominal interest rates, while fiscal policy
can induce intertemporal substitution in labor supply by changing the temporal
path of tax rates on labor income. The OEE is a central building block of virtually
every model used for policy analysis at central banks or financial institutions, no
matter how many additional features such models include.2 Smaller-scale models
(see e.g. Woodford, 2003) featuring in addition imperfect price adjustment (and
hence a Phillips curve, or inflation dynamics equation) and a Taylor-type policy
rule relating nominal interest rates to endogenous variables such as inflation and
output capture the essence of these larger-scale models.
This paper undertakes an empirical study of the OEE with a particular focus on
the stability of one parameter: AEIS. In a nutshell, while existing studies reviewed
in detail below consistently find this parameter to be not significantly diﬀerent from
zero (hence pointing to little if any evidence of intertemporal substitution), our
paper argues that this finding may be due to a structural break in this coeﬃcient:
namely, a convolution of a positive  in the pre-1979 sample and a negative one in
the later sample.
Many empirical studies have focused on the performance of single equations
in describing the dynamics of the data. To give just some prominent examples,
Sbordone (2006) and Galí and Gertler (1999) demonstrate that the New Keynesian
Phillips curve, which relates inflation to its expected value and a measure of real
activity, is able to mimic the dynamics of inflation in the United States; yet others,
starting with Taylor (1999) and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) provided empirical
evidence that simple interest rate rules relating nominal interest rates to inflation
and a measure of real activity are successful in reproducing the conduct of monetary
policy.
1In a benchmark model with CRRA utility the AEIS equals the inverse of the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion in consumption.
2A growing number of papers demonstrates the ability of medium-scale dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models to reproduce the unconditional and conditional moments in macroeco-
nomic data; see for example Christiano Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003)
and Peersman and Straub (2006).
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Although receiving an equal weight within optimization-based macroeconomic
theory, the OEE seems to be less of an empirical success story than its companions.3
One of the first papers providing a comprehensive empirical analysis of the OEE is
Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004). They find that the estimated AEIS is not signifi-
cantly diﬀerent from zero,4 a result which is confirmed by Fuhrer and Olivei (2004).
Estrella and Fuhrer (2003) also estimated an OEE and wrote that ’results [...] are
disappointing’. These results pose a serious challenge for standard theory relying
on aggregate demand logic, which predicts that AEIS is unambiguously positive (
unambiguously negative).
In a broader sense, this challenge is not new: many studies have used con-
sumption data and showed that the consumption Euler equation fails to hold at
the aggregate level.5 Most recently, Yogo (2004) undertook a comprehensive empir-
ical study for eleven countries and concluded that there is virtually no evidence for
intertemporal substitution. A plethora of papers (see e.g. Campbell, 2003) have
reached the same conclusion ever since, two decades ago, Hall (1988) concluded
that ’there is no intertemporal substitution in consumption’. Relatedly, Canzoneri,
Cumby and Diba (2007) have recently argued that the interest rate implied by con-
sumption Euler equations calculated for a variety of utility functions is negatively
correlated with the federal funds rate.6
In this paper, we propose a solution to this empirical puzzle, solution which
is made of three ingredients. First, we argue that the zero AEIS estimated over
the whole sample comes from a convolution of a negative and a positive AEIS in
two subsamples: we find evidence for such a structural break in AEIS between the
pre-1979 and the post-1982 samples.7 However, this creates an extra puzzle for
standard theory, which predicts that the AEIS is positive, i.e. aggregate demand
is negatively related to real interest rates. Therefore, we next show that a model
with limited asset markets participation can explain this shift by a change in the
share of households participating in asset markets, from low to high: at low enough
participation rates, the AEIS is indeed negative. Lastly, we provide institutional
evidence consistent with our hypothesis: profound changes took place in U.S. fi-
nancial markets–that led to more widespread asset holding–around the same date
when the AEIS changed sign.
Empirically, our first finding of an AEIS with the ’wrong’ sign in the first
subsample is rather surprising at first sight but in fact echoes estimates already
present in existing literature. The estimates presented by Hansen and Singleton
3McCallum and Nelson (1998) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) were among the first to
estimate an Euler equation for output in the context of small-scale, optimization based macroeco-
nomic models.
4Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) used both generalized method of moments (GMM) and Max-
imum likelihood (ML) methods and showed that they provide disparate estimates for the signif-
icance of the forward looking component +1; the finding of no intertemporal substitution,
however, is a robust one - not only to the estimation method used, but also to a wide variety of
output detrending methods, real interest rate definitions and (in the GMM case) instrument sets.
5See e.g. Hall (1988), Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Hansen and Singleton (1996), Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002) and Yogo (2004).
6Moreover, they show that the spread between the two is systematically linked to measures
of the monetary stance.
7 In particular, we present the results of a GMM estimation for two separate subsamples and
determine the timing of the structural break endogenously using recursive estimation and the
Wald test for GMM estimators proposed by Andrews (1993).
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(1996) using data before 1986 consistently have the ’wrong’ sign. Some of Hall’s
(1988, p. 353) estimates also share this feature,8 as do Campbell’s (2003). Finally,
Estrella and Fuhrer (2003) find a structural break in the AEIS in the same period
as ours (1979-1982), although they do not report the values of the estimates.
Theoretically, our proposed solution to the puzzle based on limited asset mar-
kets participation is related to already proposed solutions to the zero-elasticity
puzzle in the consumption literature. In particular, using micro data and taking
into account household heterogeneity with respect to their asset holding status
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) showed that significant evidence for intertemporal sub-
stitution is obtained once one excludes from the sample households who hold no
assets and therefore have no means of substituting intertemporally, or bluntly, no
Euler equation.9 This paper is related to that approach insofar as it takes into
account micro heterogeneity related to asset markets participation. The important
diﬀerences are as follows. First, we embed this assumption into a macro model and
derive its aggregate, macro implications; in that sense, in can be viewed as a macro
counterpart to Vissing-Jorgensen’s study. This is in our view worthwhile pursuing
because the OEE is used in macroeconomic models for policy analysis. Second,
we show that this approach can address not only the puzzle of ’zero intertemporal
substitution’ at the aggregate level, but also the change in the (sign of the) AEIS
documented empirically.
Furthermore, we provide a cautionary note on drawing inference about the
fraction of non-asset holding (or ’rule-of-thumb’) population based on the estima-
tion of their share of total income when using aggregate data. This is the route
taken by Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Fuhrer (2000) and Galí, Lopez-Salido and
Valles (2007). We argue that equating the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers
with their share in total income is subject to a potentially sizeable bias insofar
as there is income heterogeneity between asset holders and non-asset holders: if
non-asset holders (rule-of-thumb consumers) merely consume their wage income
(whereas asset holders receive asset income), the elasticity of their consumption
to total income will crucially depend on aggregate labor supply elasticity and not
only on their weight in the population. We outline an example and quantify the
magnitude of this potential bias.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the reason why we focus on the output (as
opposed to consumption) Euler equation is not only its relevance for macroeconomic
models, but also to avoid issues raised by non-separability of consumption and
leisure in the utility function explored by Basu and Kimball (2006) and Galí et al.
(2007) and reviewed below. In fact, we show that our OEE can occur under non-
separable preferences, but only limited asset markets participation can generate the
change in sign of the AEIS that we document empirically.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present
our empirical evidence, using structural break tests and GMM estimation that the
AEIS switched sign in the late 1970s, early 1980s. In Section 3, we show that a
model with limited asset market participation can explain this empirical finding by
8Hall (1988) rejects such estimates as implausible since they would imply non-concave utility
in a representative-agent framework.
9See also and Brav, Constantinides and Geczy (2002) for a related study using limited par-
ticipation to address asset pricing puzzles. Guvenen (2006) studies a calibrated business cycle
model with limited stock parket participation and preference heterogeneity; we discuss this in
some detail in Section 3.
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an increase in the share of asset market participants. In section 4 we put together
some background institutional evidence suggesting that the U.S. economy in the
mid 1960’s and 1970s was indeed characterized by lower asset market participation
as compared to the post-1980 period. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2. The estimated AEIS: a convolution of positive and negative values?
In this section, we assess the structural stability of the OEE over the post-1965
period.10 To that end, we follow Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) (see also Fuhrer and
Olivei 2005) and use the same data set, variables, and estimation method.11 We
present evidence that a significant change in the AEIS occurred in the 1979-1982
period. This evidence comes from a few sources: (i) estimates over the subsamples
1965-1979 and 1982-2003; (ii) recursive estimations; (iii) test for structural change.
We estimate by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) the following
’expanded’ OEE:12
(2.1)
 = 0 + 1−1 + 2−2 + +1 + −
⎡
⎣1
−1X
=0
(++ − +++1)
⎤
⎦+ 
This form generalizes the simple Euler equation over four dimensions discussed in
detail in Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004): influence of lagged terms of the output
gap, flexible timing of expectation formation (),13 influence of past real rates
(captured by ), and flexible interest rate duration (governed by ) In the first
set of estimations, we perform robustness checks by using diﬀerent methods to
detrend output: (i) a Hodrick-Prescott filter; (ii) a segmented linear trend with
one break; (iii) a segmented trend with two breaks; (iv) a quadratic trend; (v) a
segmented quadratic trend; (vi) the ’potential output’ measure of the Congressional
Budget Oﬃce (CBO); (vi) one-sided band-pass filter (BP2). In what follows, we
will focus on the (most widely used) HP filtered output gap. The variable  stands
for the quarterly average of the overnight federal funds rate and inflation  is the
annualized log change in the price index.14 One issue concerns the instrument set
to be used for estimations: following Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) and Fuhrer and
Olivei (2005), we use four lags of the output gap, federal funds rate and inflation.
In the robustness analysis, we also use the same set of exogenous instruments: (four
lags of) real defense expenditure, relative oil prices and the political party of the
sitting U.S. President.
1 0Following Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004), we choose 1965 as a starting date since only
thereafter did the federal funds rate act as the primary instrument of monetary policy.
11We thank Jeﬀrey Fuhrer, Glenn Rudebusch and Liz Walat for providing us with the data.
12Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) also provide Monte Carlo evidence that GMM estimates are
more likely to be subject to bias than maximum likelihood estimates. However, as the evidence in
their paper indicates, this objection is particularly binding for estimates of the parameter , i.e.
the coeﬃcient on future output. The evidence on the  coeﬃcient is at best mixed.
13For GMM estimation, this is implicitly given by the timing of instruments: e.g., =1 when
lags of the instruments are considered.
14Note that the interest rate used in the estimation is the four-quarter moving average when
 = 4 .
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2.1. No endogenous persistence - the simplest version. For a first test,
we perform estimations of the OEE under no endogenous persistence, i.e. setting
1 = 2 = 0  = 1,  = 0 in (2.1), such that  strictly corresponds to the (negative
of the) theoretical AEIS:
 = 0 + +1 +  [ −+1] + 
We estimate the equation over the two subsamples: the pre-Volcker ’Great Infla-
tion’ period, 1965:4-1979:3 and the Volcker-Greenspan period excluding the Vol-
cker disinflation, 1983:1-2003:1. While we exclude the Volcker disinflation period
for comparison with the studies performing this sample-splitting exercise for mon-
etary policy rules, such as Clarida, Galí, Gertler (2000), when performing recursive
estimation below we consider the whole sample.
The results reported in Table 1 show estimates of the coeﬃcients with standard
errors, and the -value from Hansen’s -test. The estimates show a change in the
sign of  from a positive value, which is inconsistent with standard economic theory,
to a negative value predicted by the standard logic. At the same time, the coeﬃcient
on expected output  is almost always close to unity, as expected from theory. The
estimates for  are generally not significant, which is a result also obtained by Fuhrer
and Rudebusch for the whole sample for the case without endogenous persistence.
This is natural, given that we do not include lagged value of output among the
regressors; the specification studied next allows us to obtain significant estimates
for this parameter, too. Lastly, the instruments are valid as judged by the -test
and the results are reassuringly robust to the detrending method used, to whether
contemporaneous or lagged interest rate is included and to the instrument set.15
2.2. The OEE under Endogenous Persistence. Fuhrer and Rudebusch
(2004) argue that testing for the simplest version of the OEE might be marked by
misspecification, due to the absence of other potentially relevant dynamic eﬀects
such as those embodied in (2.1) and described before. They indeed find that lagged
terms of output are significant economically and statistically16, and the coeﬃcient
on expected output is significantly lower than one. However, the  parameter is
not significantly diﬀerent from zero for most estimations for the whole sample, no
matter the timing and duration of interest rate used, the output detrending method,
the instrument set or the estimation method employed. Hence, we also estimate
the richer version of the OEE (2.1) by GMM17 and try to assess the stability of
this parameter. Results are reported in Table 2, where for the sake of brevity we
only deal with HP-filtered output and endogenous instruments. The coeﬃcient
 changes again sign from positive and significant to negative and (statistically)
significant.
15Not all permutations are reported in the table, but this result carries over to most of
the possible combinations of interest rate timing, output detrending method and instrument set
used. Note that the -test test is distributed with 9 degrees of freedom (12 when using exogenous
instruments) since we only estimate three parameters.
16This echoes results obtained by Fuhrer (2000), who proposes a model based on habit
formation that can explain such endogenous persistence.
17Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) also perform MLE estimation and show that it performs
better as far as estimation of the forward-looking coeﬃcient is concerned, but the two methods
lead to similar results as far as the AEIS is concerned. We stick to the simpler GMM method for
estimating the OEE; in a companion paper, we adopt a Bayesian estimation method and treat all
variables as endogenous - see Bilbiie and Straub (2006).
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TABLE 1: GMM estimation of the no-persistence OEE for the two sub-samples
potential output  SE()  SE() -test -val
Pre-Volcker
HP ( = 0) 0.85 0.11 0.30 0.10 0.59
HP ( = −1) 1.15 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.71
Quadratic 0.97 0.06 0.33 0.12 0.67
Segmented 1.02 0.07 0.25 0.13 0.65
ST2 1.03 0.05 0.28 0.10 0.82
ST952 1.02 0.05 0.28 0.11 0.81
CBO 1.03 0.05 0.33 0.12 0.74
BP2 1.02 0.05 0.16 0.04 0.55
HP, exog. instr. 0.94 0.08 0.16 0.05 0.86
Quadratic, exog. instr. 0.99 0.04 0.35 0.06 0.97
CBO, exog. instr. 1.04 0.03 0.32 0.06 0.97
ST, exog. instr. 0.99 0.05 0.33 0.06 0.96
ST952, exog. instr. 1.15 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.71
Volcker-Greenspan
HP, ( = 0) 1.43 0.10 -0.13 0.04 0.62
HP ( = −1) 1.36 0.09 -0.11 0.04 0.50
Quadratic 0.94 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.34
Segmented 1.07 0.05 -0.09 0.06 0.32
ST2 1.22 0.03 -0.20 0.03 0.65
ST952 1.26 0.03 -0.15 0.03 0.67
CBO 1.18 0.03 -0.08 0.04 0.47
BP2 1.10 0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.25
HP, exog. instr. 0.57 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.85
ST, exog. instr. 1.04 0.04 -0.14 0.04 0.69
ST952, exog. instr. 1.05 0.06 -0.12 0.04 0.72
TABLE 2: GMM estimation of the augmented OEE for the two sub-samples
interest rate 1 + 2  SE()  SE() J-test p-val.
Pre-Volcker
 = 4 = 0 0.53 0.35 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.446
 = 4 = −1 0.46 0.32 0.11 0.23 0.07 0.489
 = 1 = 0 0.13 0.89 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.572
 = 1 = −1 0.58 0.46 0.08 -0.04 0.08 0.476
Volcker-Greenspan
 = 4 = 0 0.54 0.53 0.08 -0.015 0.01 0.158
 = 4 = −1 0.53 0.52 0.07 -0.014 0.01 0.164
 = 1 = 0 0.5 0.65 0.10 -0.050 0.01 0.161
 = 1 = −1 0.46 0.69 0.11 -0.050 0.01 0.152
2.3. Finding the Structural Break in the AEIS Endogenously. To fur-
ther grasp the evolution over time of the estimated , we perform a recursive esti-
mation. For the remainder of the analysis we focus on the richer specification (2.1),
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using HP-filtered output gap, endogenous instruments and the interest rate corre-
sponding to  = 4 = −1 In Figure 1, we report the results of ’increasing sample’
estimates of , i.e. estimates obtained by running the GMM estimation for an initial
sample of 50 observations, and then augmenting the sample by one observation at
each iteration. The results reported in Figure 1 (together with two-standard-error
bands) show a sharp decrease in the coeﬃcient from a positive significant value to
a value close to zero. This decline occurs around quarter 18, which added to 50
observations used in the initial estimation suggests a break date just before 1982.
Figure 1. Increasing-sample estimates of  (large-dash) ± two standard error
bands (small-dash for + and solid for − respectively).
In order to test more rigorously for a structural break in the  coeﬃcient, we
employ the Wald test proposed by Andrews (1993) for GMM estimators. This test
is designed to find a structural change when the date of the change is unknown.
The null hypothesis of the test is parameter stability, and is rejected for large values
of the statistic. The statistic is constructed by splitting the sample into two parts,
calculating the coeﬃcients and the corresponding variances and then moving the
threshold towards the end of the sample and repeating the exercise. A value of
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the statistic is found at each iteration; the test is a ’sup’ test, so the date with
the largest statistic is the date where it is most likely that the change occurred.
Statistical significance can be judged using the critical values calculated by Andrews
(1993). Figure 2 reports the Wald statistic for coeﬃcient , where we look for the
break over the whole sample (excluding the first and last 47 observations). The
statistic clearly suggests that there is a change in the coeﬃcient around quarter 21,
which added to the initial 47 observations leads to 1981:1 as the suggested break.
The other high values of the statistic are obtained starting from around 1979. This
is robust to searches performed over diﬀerent samples, with diﬀerent timing and
duration of the interest rate. The break (as indicated by this test) is always inside
the 1979-1982 period.
Figure 2: Andrews’ Wald statistic for  (solid line) and 5 and 10 percent critical
values (large and small dash, respectively).
What can explain this evidence? In the following section, we introduce a model
that can generate an AEIS without a restricted sign: indeed, the sign depends on
the share of people participating in asset markets. We then present institutional
evidence that the share of households participating in asset markets in the US has
changed dramatically in the late 1970s -early 1980s.
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3. Explaining the Empirical Evidence: Limited Asset Market
Participation and the OEE.
We briefly outline a theory that allows the derivation of the OEE under lim-
ited asset market participation (LAMP, for short) and can generate a change in
the sign of the AEIS driven by changes in one parameter: the fraction of agents
participating in asset markets. We model LAMP in a way that has become stan-
dard in the macroeconomic literature reviewed below. Namely, we assume that a
fraction of agents have zero asset holdings, and hence do not smooth consumption
but merely consume their current disposable income, while the rest of the agents
hold all assets and smooth consumption. Models incorporating this insight have
been recently used in the macroeconomic literature. First, some version of this
assumption -whereby a fraction of agents does not hold physical capital- has been
proposed by Mankiw (2000) and extended by Galí, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007)
for fiscal policy issues.18 Second, the monetary policy literature trying to capture
the ’liquidity eﬀect’ assumes that asset markets are ’segmented’, leading to a set up
similar to ours. (e.g. Alvarez, Lucas and Weber, 2003). Finally, and most relatedly,
two recent monetary policy studies by Galí et al. (2004) and Bilbiie (2008) have
used this assumption and addressed issues of stability properties of interest rate
rules, optimal monetary policy, and the relationship between monetary policy and
macroeconomic performance.
This modelling choice is motivated both by direct data on asset holdings and
by an extensive empirical literature studying consumption behavior. The latter
seems to suggest that, regardless of whether aggregate time series or micro data are
used, consumption tracks current income for a large fraction of the US population
(Campbell and Mankiw, 1989 and Fuhrer, 2000). More recent studies using micro
data also find that a significant fraction of the US population fails to behave as
prescribed by the permanent income hypothesis (e.g. Hurst, 2006; Parker, 1999;
Souleles, 1999 and Johnson et al., 2004).19 Finally, direct data on asset holdings
shows that a low fraction of US population holds assets in various forms.20 In
a general sense, this paper can be regarded as adding to this growing literature
that points to the relevance of limited asset market participation to explain certain
macroeconomic phenomena.
This paper’s theoretical model is also related to an important contribution by
Guvenen (2006), who studies a calibrated business cycle model with limited stock
market participation and heterogeneity in individual elasticities of intertemporal
substitution EIS. He shows that such model can explain capital and output fluctu-
ations as long as most of the wealth is held by individuals with a high EIS, despite
the majority of the population having a low EIS (and hence generating a low AEIS
18The latter paper argues that this modelling assumption can help explaining the eﬀects of
government spending shocks. See also Bilbiie and Straub (2004).
19Johnson et al. (2004) show that a large part of the US population consumed the unexpected
increase in transitory income generated by the 2001 tax rebate and find that the response was
higher for households with low wealth. Relatedly, Wolﬀ and Caner (2002) use 1999 PSID data to
find that 41.7 percent of the US population can be classified as asset-poor when home equity is
excluded from net worth, whereas 25.9 percent are asset-poor based on net worth data.
20Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) reports based on the PSID data that of US population 21.75
percent hold stock and 31.40 percent hold bonds. Data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer
Finances shows that 59 percent of US population had no interest-bearing financial assets, while
25 percent had no checking account either.
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when judged by data on consumption). Our model is similar in spirit to Guve-
nen’s, since in his framework households who hold no stocks but hold bonds are
also those households who do little intertemporal substitution due to preferences
(have a low EIS). In our framework, failure to substitute intertemporally occurs
(in equilibrium) because our non-asset holders are also excluded from the bond
market.21 When trying to explain a change in the sign of the AEIS documented
above, our model does not rely on structural changes in the preference structure,
something that would be needed in Guvenen’s framework in order to explain this
evidence. Lastly, one fundamental diﬀerence between two frameworks is that there
is no steady state in Guvenen (markets are incomplete); in our framework, markets
are segmented and a steady state exists, which allows us to analyze the switch of
the AEIS sign analytically.22
The exposition here is stripped down to the essential. We adopt a set of as-
sumptions that make the model particularly tractable without aﬀecting its essence:
in particular, log utility and increasing returns to scale due to a fixed cost and
inducing zero steady-state profits. We refer the interested reader to Bilbiie (2008)
for a full-fledged theoretical analysis of this framework, and to our Appendix A for
a model with habit formation that nests this simple version as a special case.
There are two types of households: asset holders indexed by , trading state-
contingent assets and shares in firms, consuming  and working  hours; and
non-asset holders indexed by , who do not participate in any of the asset markets
and simply consume  their current disposable income resulting from working
 hours at the market real wage .23 The shares of these agents in the total
population are 1− and  respectively and are assumed to be constant. We focus on
small fluctuations around a steady state and let lowercase letters denote percentage
deviations of a variable from its steady-state value. Consumption of asset-holders
obeys a standard Euler equation:  = +1−[ − +1]  where −+1
is the real interest rate (since utility is logarithmic, the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption is one).
In order to derive an aggregate Euler equation, or the OEE, we need to express
consumption of asset holders as a function of total consumption and hence output.
Total consumption is given by definition as  =  + [1− ] 24 Under log
utility, consumption of non-asset holders is equal to the real wage  =  since
their labor supply is fixed  = 025 Using asset holders’ labor supply schedule
 =  +  where  is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and the
definition of total labor supply  = [1− ] consumption of non-asset holders
21Indeed, if one set the EIS for non-stockholders to zero in Guvenen (2006), one would recover
an asset market structure that is very similar to this paper’s.
22We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this diﬀerence.
23In the background of non-participation in asset markets there could be many reasons (con-
straints or preferences); but as long as all reasons have the same observational consequence, their
relative importance is immaterial for our purposes. Our preferred explanation consists of con-
straints such as transactions costs; recent theoretical and empirical research shows that such mar-
ket frictions alone could account for the observed participation shares (see e.g. Vissing-Jorgensen,
2002 and He and Modest, 1995).
24This approximation only holds if steady-state consumption shares of the two types are
equal, i.e. asset income is zero in steady-state. This will be insured by appropriate conditions on
the production side.
25For log utility, income and substitution eﬀects on labor are cancelled out. See Appendix A
of Bilbiie (2007) for the case whereby labor supply of non-asset holders is also elastic.
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is  =  = + (1− )−1  Substituted in the consumption definition, this
implies:  =  (1− )−1  +  We can further substitute hours worked by
using the production function for final output  = [1 + ] + [1 + ]  where 
represents both the steady-state net mark-up and the degree of aggregate increasing
returns to scale26 and  is exogenous technology, and use the goods market clearing
condition  =  (aggregate expenditure consists of consumption only), to solve for
consumption of asset-holders as:
(3.1)  =  + (1 + ) (1− )   where  ≡ 1−  
1− 
1
1 + 
Substituting (3.1) into the Euler equation of asset holders we find the OEE, or
’intertemporal IS curve’:
(3.2)  = +1 − −1 [ −+1] + (1 + ) ¡1− −1¢ [ − +1]
Direct inspection of (3.2) suggests the non-linear impact that LAMP has on
the AEIS −1 Specifically, there exists a threshold value of the share of non-asset
holders beyond which the AEIS changes sign, which is given by:27
(3.3) ∗ = 1
1 +  (1 + ) 
For high enough participation rates   ∗ ,  is positive and we are in what we
call the ’Standard Aggregate Demand Logic’ region (SADL for short), whereby real
interest rates restrain aggregate demand. As  increases towards ∗, the sensitivity
of aggregate demand to interest rates increases in absolute value, making policy
more eﬀective in containing demand. However, once  is above the threshold ∗
we move to the ’Inverted Aggregate Demand Logic’ region (IADL for short) where
increases in real interest rates become expansionary. As  tends to its upper bound
of 1, −1 decreases towards zero, and monetary policy is ineﬀective as nobody holds
assets. The IADL case occurs when enough agents consume their wage income 
( high) and/or wage is sensitive enough to real income  ( high). Calculations
in Bilbiie (2008) show that for a range of  between 1 (unit elasticity) and 10 (0.1
elasticity) the threshold share of non-asset holders is lower than 0.5 to as low as
around 0.1 respectively.
How can an increase in interest rates become expansionary when asset market
participation is restricted enough? To answer this question, it is useful to conduct
a simple mental experiment whereby the monetary authority engineers a one-time
discretionary increase in the real interest rate  − +1 In the standard, full-
participation economy, an increase in interest rates leads to a fall in aggregate
demand today. Asset holders are also willing to work more at a given real wage
(labor supply shifts rightward), but labor demand shifts left if prices are sticky
(not all the fall in demand can be accommodated via cutting prices). The new
equilibrium is one with lower output, consumption, hours and real wage. Suppose
now that we are in an economy with limited participation, but   ∗ either
because participation is not restricted ’enough’ or labor supply is not inelastic
26This insures that asset income is zero in steady-state, inducing equalization of steady-state
consumption shares and hours, so that all algebra here is consistent.
27Note that the only way for  to be independent of  is for  to be zero, i.e. labor supply of
asset holders be infinitely elastic. In this case, consumption of all agents is independent of wealth,
making the heterogeneity introduced in this paper irrelevant.
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enough. The fall in real wage brought about by the intertemporal substitution of
asset holders now means a further fall in demand, since non-asset holders merely
consume their wage income. This generates a further shift in labor demand, so the
new equilibrium is one with even lower (compared to the full-participation one)
output, consumption, hours and real wage.
This eﬀect could at first sight seem monotonic over the whole domain of  : the
more restricted asset market participation, the stronger the contractionary eﬀect
on demand and hence on labor demand, and hence the more eﬀective monetary
policy. In order to understand why this is not the case, it is helpful to consider
the additional distributional dimension introduced by limited asset market partic-
ipation. The further demand eﬀect that occurs because of non-asset holders has
an eﬀect on profits: both marginal cost (wage) and sales (output and hours) fall.
The relative size of these reductions (and the final eﬀect on profits) depends on
the relative mass of non-asset holders and on labor supply elasticity. In particu-
lar, if labor supply is inelastic enough and/if asset market participation is limited
enough such that   ∗ an increase in profits would occur that would generate a
positive income eﬀect on asset holders.28 This expansionary eﬀect contradicts both
the initial ’intertemporal substitution’ eﬀect on labor supply of asset holders and
the contractionary eﬀect of monetary policy on their demand. For equilibrium to
be consistent with the initial incentives, labor demand has to shift rightward. The
equilibrium is reached whereby the expansion in labor demand is high enough to
generate an increase in real wage (that suﬃces to make non-asset-holders demand
the extra output produced), and low enough not to generate a too strong fall in
profits (that would instead imply a further reduction in demand from asset hold-
ers). This is an equilibrium whereby consumption, output, hours and the real wage
increase - hence ’expansionary monetary contractions’.
3.1. The OEE with Habits. In this section we show how the introduction
of habit formation into the limited asset markets participation model can give rise
to an OEE of the form estimated in section 2 above. Reassuringly, we find that the
AEIS can still switch sign for low enough degrees of limited participation, as our
empirical results suggest.
The utility function is given by:  ( ) = ln ( − −1)−1+  (1 + ) 
Leaving the rest of the economy unchanged, we obtain the following modified OEE,
which is a theoretical counterpart to the estimated equation (see Appendix A for
details and derivation):
(3.4)  = Γ1Γ1 + Γ2+1 +
Γ2
Γ1 + Γ2 −1 −
1− 
Γ1 + Γ2 [ −+1] + 
where
Γ1 = 1− 
1− 

1 + 
∙
1 +

1 +  (1− )
¸
Γ2 = 
∙
1− 
1− 

1 +  (1− )
¸
28Note that asset holders have in their portfolio (1− )−1 shares: if total profits fell by
one unit, dividend income of one asset holder would fall by (1− )−1  1 units. In the standard
model all agents hold assets, so this channel is completely irrelevant. Any increase in wage exactly
compensates the decrease in dividends, since all output is consumed by asset holders.
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Note that for  = 0 this reduces to the economy without habits in the previous
section since Γ2 = 0 and Γ1 = 1 − 1− 1+ = . If  = 0 this boils down to a
standard economy with habits: Γ1 = 1Γ2 =  A negative AEIS occurs if and only
if:
  1 + 
1 +  + 1+
³
1 + (1+2)1+(1−)
´
Numerical simulations for plausible parameter values suggest that the threshold
 obtained under habits is largely invariant to the magnitude of .29 Therefore, a
change in asset market participation is consistent with the switch in the sign of the
AEIS documented above for the case with habit persistence.
3.2. Relation to Campbell and Mankiw (1989). Campbell and Mankiw
(1989), henceforth CM, estimate the share of ’rule-of-thumb’ households by assum-
ing that these households consume a constant fraction of total income, and that
this fraction (denoted by  ) is equal to the share of rule-of-thumb households
in the population.30 Specifically, CM assume (where ˆ and ˆ denote average
consumption and income per group):
ˆ = ˆ = 
Together with the assumption that consumption of the optimizing agents follows
permanent income (ˆ is consumption of this group), total consumption is given
by:
 =  + ˆ or in diﬀerences:(3.5)
∆ = ∆ +∆ˆ =  + ∆ + 
where  is the change in agents’ assessment of total permanent income. This is the
equation estimated by CM.
The diﬀerence between this approach and ours can be seen most clearly by
comparing (3.5) with a similar expression derived in our framework:31
(3.6)  = 
1− 

1 +  +  −

1− 
The partial elasticity of consumption to total income is, in our case, a non-linear
function of the share of non-asset holders, labor supply elasticity and the steady-
state markup (degree of market power). Specifically, the two coincide if:
 = 
1− 

1 + 
However, as discussed above, the sensitivity of consumption to income can in our
case be larger than one and induce a negative AEIS, whereas in CM it cannot. The
fundamental diﬀerence32 is that we assume that non-asset holders’ income is made
29Results are available from the authors upon request.
30The same assumption is used by i.a. Fuhrer (2000), Gali et al (2007) and Canzoneri et al
(2007).
31To derive this expression, one starts from the expression for total consumption derived in
text:  = 1− +  and susbtitutes hours using the production function.
32A similar discussion applies to the comparison between our model with habits and the
model with habits of Fuhrer (2000), who also estimates the share of rule of thumb consumers a la
CM.
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only of labor income, whereas CM assume that it is equal to total income (and
hence includes capital income also).
However, if one believes that rule-of-thumb behavior is related to non-participation
in asset markets (and/or not holding physical capital), as e.g. in Mankiw (2000),
Alvarez, Lucas and Weber (2001), Galí, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2004, 2007) and
Bilbiie (2008), one cannot merely use the estimates of CM in order to parameterize
the extent of limited asset markets participation: rule-of-thumb households do not
receive any income other than labor income, since they do not hold any form of
capital (be it physical or claims to profits). Therefore, their share of total income
(and hence the elasticity of total consumption to total current income) becomes a
non-linear, increasing function of: their share in population, the inverse of labor
supply elasticity and of the share of profits (or the degree of increasing returns).
It is then clear that macroeconomic models using a framework similar to ours but
appealing to the CM estimate  in order to ’calibrate’ the parameter  are over-
estimating the share of rule-of-thumb households. For example, calibrating  using
the Campbell-Mankiw estimate  = 05 for standard values of net markup
 = 02 and inverse labor elasticity  = 2 delivers  = 023 i.e. less than half the
original estimate.33
3.3. The OEE under Non-separable Preferences. In a recent paper,
Basu and Kimball (2006) have argued that non-separability of consumption and
leisure in the utility function has important implications for the estimation of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This section considers the same type of
preferences used by Basu and Kimball (2006) and shows that: (i) they cannot de-
liver the change in the sign of the AEIS documented here and (ii) they imply an
OEE that is very similar to the one derived under separable preferences. Intuitively,
under non-separable preferences the growth of hours worked appears in the con-
sumption Euler equation. However, as one uses a general equilibrium restriction
(the resource constraint) to substitute consumption for output, one may equiva-
lently use the production function to substitute hours for output and hence obtain
an aggregate Euler equation that features only output.34
Specifically, we consider non-separable preferences consistent with balanced
growth:  ( ) =
n
[ (1−)]1− − 1
o
 (1− )  where  () is a function of
leisure 1 − and  are hours worked. In Appendix B, we show that the OEE
becomes (if  () is the power function), abstracting from shocks:
 = +1 − −1 [ −+1] 
33Finally, note that we can rewrite our equation (36) in diﬀerence form, using the Euler
equation of asset holders to express the growth in their consumption as a function of real interest
rates, as:
∆ = 
1− 

1 + ∆ + [ −+1]−

1− ∆
Comparing this with the corresponding equation used by CM, one notices that in our framework
the ’residual’  would naturally occur as a combination of real interest rates and (the first
diﬀerence of) any exogenous shocks (in our example, technology).
34Note that this is not very diﬀerent from what Basu and Kimball (2006) do; they do not
estimate the coeﬃcient on hours growth in the Euler equation, but use general equilibrium restric-
tions to parameterize it using the labor share in consumption expenditure from national income
accounts.
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where
 ≡ 
−1
1− 1− 1+ + −1−1(1+)(1−)

and  = (1 − ) is pinned down by steady-state hours worked. One can see
immediately that under full participation ( = 0)   is always positive: hence, the
assumption of non-separable preferences cannot, by itself, generate the change in
the sign of AEIS documented above. Moreover, Galí et al. (2007) have shown that
the Euler equation obtained under non-separable preferences and full asset markets
participation is inconsistent with evidence presented by Parker (1999), Souleles
(1999), Johnson et al. (2004) and Galí et al. (2007) themselves, showing that
temporary changes in lump-sum taxes have an eﬀect of consumption. The evidence
presented in the previous section suggests instead that failure by some agents to
behave as prescribed by standard neoclassical theory is of empirical importance.
4. Institutional Evidence for the Change in Asset Markets
Participation
In this section we put together some background institutional evidence suggest-
ing that the U.S. economy in the mid 1960’s and 1970s was characterized by lower
asset market participation as compared to the post-1980 period. That is, we give
economic substance to the econometric results presented above.
The change in asset markets participation is problematic to pin down: there
is to our knowledge no empirical study documenting such a change, let alone that
data availability problems abound. 35 However, there is institutional information to
support our view that financial markets changed fundamentally in the early 1980s,
leading to more widespread asset holding. Mishkin (1991) and references quoted
therein provide a comprehensive review of financial market developments in this
period. For a variety of reasons having to do with excessive regulation, in the ’70s
asset holding was limited and most assets held by small savers were not making
interest linked to market interest rates. In a nutshell, two restrictions were preva-
lent (i) limits on interest paid by commercial banks to allow S&L to pay slightly
more interest (Regulation Q), and no interest was being paid on checking accounts;
(ii) discouragement of other financial market instruments - in 1970 Treasury was
convinced to raise minimum denomination on T-bills to 10,000 USD, and bank
holding companies and corporations not to issue small-denominated debt. Hence,
small savers were not making the market interest rate, which was well recognized
at least by Congress (and was to trigger a legislative response).
This situation changed in 1980, due both to legislators’ response via deregula-
tion and to markets’ response via financial innovation, causes which are sometimes
hard to disentangle. On the latter point, Wenninger (1984) and Silber (1983) list
literally hundreds of instruments created by financial innovation, most of them
gaining wide usage in the post-1980 period.36 On the former point, 1980 saw the
35Consumer Expenditure Survey data on asset holdings starts only in 1984, while the Sur-
vey of Consumer Finances over-samples high-wealth households (making it inappropriate for our
exercise). The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) contains wealth data with a five-year
frequency only starting in 1984. Some wealth information is contained in the family files previous
to 1984.
36Among them: a. consumer assets (saver certificates, money-market MM mutual funds,
ceiling-free MM certificates, NOW and super-NOW accounts, MM deposit account); b. consumer
credit and mortgages (equity access accoutns, secondary mortgage market, floating-rate loans,
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adoption of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
(DIDMCA).37 Among the most important provisions, the DIDMCA introduced a
phaseout of Regulation Q, let Savings&Loans Institutions make other types of loans
and engage in other activities, approved many of the new instruments mentioned
above nationwide, eliminated usury ceilings on mortgage loans and some business
loans and provided uniform access to Fed reserve facilities for all depository insti-
tutions.
To give just an example (see Mishkin, 1991) of the magnitude of the change
in financial markets: total assets of Money Market mutual funds increased from
4 billion in 1978 to 230 billion in 1982, and NOW accounts increased from 27
to 101 billion from 1980 to 1982. Moreover, the early 1980s saw the advent of
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), an important new saving vehicle. The
introduction and spreading of new financial instruments and the elimination of
ceilings on deposit rates (re-)linked saving decisions to market interest rates, which
justifies our assumption about the change in asset market participation across the
two periods.
This is further supported by evidence from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances data on asset holdings and net worth. Table 8 therein shows that from 1970
to 1983 the percentage of families holding certificates of deposit changed from 8 to
20, for money market accounts from 0 to 14. Table 5 in the Second report shows
that the percentage of families with net worth less than 10.000 USD fell from 56%
to 38% (see Wolﬀ and Caner (2002) for a careful study of asset-poverty dynamics
using post-1984 PSID data). Finally, the New York Stock Exchange reports that
the proportion of U.S. families holding shares has almost doubled over the period
1975-1985 (see NYSE,1986). Duca (2001) presents further evidence that the decline
in transaction costs (e.g. mutual fund loads, brokerage fees, and cost of exchange-
traded funds) led to more widespread asset holding since the early 1980s. Jones
(2002) also shows -see his Fig. 3 and 4- that commissions and spreads for shares at
the NYSE have declined abruptly in the late 1970s and early 1980s (e.g., one-way
transaction costs declined from about 1.20 percentage points in the mid 70s to 0.60
in the early 80s). Corroborated with the phasing out of Regulation Q such that
savings account started actually making the market interest rate, all these argu-
ments complete our justification for believing that the U.S. economy before 1980
was marked by relatively more limited asset markets participation.
5. Conclusion
Available estimates of the output Euler equation OEE consistently find in-
significant values of the parameter governing the aggregate elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution AEIS (and hence the elasticity of aggregate demand to interest
rates);38 as such, they pose a serious challenge to any macroeconomic model based
leasing and flexible credits, variable rate mortgages and consumption installment loans); c. Trea-
sury securities (variable rate bonds, adjustable-rate Fannie MAE, etc.); d. Tax-exempt securities;
e. corporate bonds (deep-discound bonds, zero coupon and variable-rate bonds, bonds with war-
rants and IR swaps); f. futures and options on cash market instruments, stock market indices,
etc.
37Followed by the Garn-StGermain Act reinforcing such de-regulatory provisions.
38These findings are consistent with those of a related literature estimating Euler equations
using consumption data briefly reviewed in the Introduction.
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on intertemporal substitution. Even if prices were sticky, in the absence of intertem-
poral substitution the monetary authority would have no leverage in influencing the
economy. And even if taxation were distortionary, the fiscal authorities’ choice of
tax rates (for example on labor income) would leave the intertemporal allocation
of labor unaﬀected.
In this paper we address this puzzle and propose an explanation based on three
ingredients. Firstly, we argue that the zero AEIS over the whole post-1965 sample
may be a convolution of elasticities with opposite signs over two subsamples, before
and after the ’Great Deflation’ period. We conduct structural break tests allowing
for an endogenous breakpoint, and find the break date in the interval 1979-1982.
While the AEIS estimated on post-1982 data is consistent with standard economic
theory and intuition, the pre-1979 elasticity’s ’wrong’ sign poses a diﬀerent challenge
to macroeconomic models (since in a representative agent framework it would imply
’negative intertemporal substitution’). So secondly, we propose a model based on
limited asset markets participation whereby the AEIS depends on the share of asset
holders; we show that this model can generate the change in the sign of AEIS when
the share of asset holders switches from a low to a high value. Furthermore, we show
that our framework gives some interesting insights about the validity of estimates of
the share of rule-of-thumb households in the economy based on income data as e.g.
proposed. in Campbell and Mankiw (1989). Additionally, we show that our set up
is compatible with a model with non-separable preferences as discussed in Basu and
Kimball (2006), with the advantage of being able to deliver the estimated sign switch
in the slope of the OEE. Finally, we review institutional evidence consistent with
the discussed hypothesis, based on the tremendous amount of financial deregulation
and innovation which led to more widespread participation in asset markets since
the late 1970s and early 1980s.
This paper is a small part of a much larger picture. There is mounting evidence
that other structural changes have happened in the US economy at the same time,
most notably the end of the ’Great Inflation’ period and the start of the Great
Moderation (i.e. the fall in aggregate macroeconomic volatility). These changes
are potentially related to changes in the stochastic distributions of shocks (Blinder,
1982) and in monetary policy conduct (Taylor, 1999 and Clarida, Gali and Gertler,
2000). Nevertheless, the evidence that we provide in this paper might help us un-
derstand the puzzle raised by existing estimates of the AEIS, by providing a possible
structural interpretation of that puzzle. We explore this structural interpretation
in related work (Bilbiie and Straub, 2011).
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Appendix A. The OEE under LAMP and Habit Formation
In this Appendix, we explore the implications of habit formation in consump-
tion, which leads to an OEE featuring endogenous persistence, just as for the
equation estimated in Section 2. Each type of consumer maximizes the present dis-
counted value of the utility function:  ( ) = ln ( − −1)−1+  (1 + ) 
subject to a budget constraint, which is given by, for each type respectively:
−1 +1 +  =  +  +
 = 
where +1 is a portfolio of bonds carried in period +1 and  are real dividend
payments on the portfolio of shares; the latter will be equal to (1− )−1 times total
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monopoly profits. Optimality conditions are:
−1 = 
∙+1

 − −1
+1 − 
¸
(A.1)
 = 1 − −1

(A.2)
 = 1 − −1

(A.3)
The rest of the economy is standard, see Bilbiie (2008) for details: monopolistically
competitive firms produce the consumption goods at a marginal cost equal to the
real wage in eﬀective units and maximize profits. As a result, price is a markup
over marginal cost: a constant markup, if prices are flexible, and a time-varying
one, if prices are sticky. Equilibrium is obtained by imposing that all markets clear:
the goods market, the labor market, and financial markets (which instead implies
that bonds are in zero net supply and that each asset holder will hold (1− )−1
shares and receive dividends on this portfolio).
We loglinearize all optimality conditions around a non-stochastic steady state,
which is determined as follows. The Euler equation of asset holders implies  ≡
1 +  = −1 The marginal cost (the inverse of the gross markup) of a monop-
olistically competitive firm producing under linear technology subject to a fixed
cost is [ (1 +  )] so the labor share is  = ¡1 +  ¢  (1 + ) and
the profit share  = ( − )  (1 + )  Under the simplifying (but innocu-
ous - see Bilbiie 2007) assumption that increasing returns due to fixed costs make
profits be zero in steady state  −  we obtain that hours and consumption
shares are the same for the two groups (in steady state only)  =  = 
 =  =  =  =
In order to derive the loglinearized OEE, we follow the same steps as those
used for the economy without habits. The Euler equation of asset holders is:
 − −1 = +1 −  − (1− ) [ −+1]
The optimality conditions of non-asset holders in loglinearized form are  =
 − (1− )−1 ( − −1) and  =  +  Combining the two, we obtain
 =
µ
1− 
1 +  (1− )
¶
 + 
1 +  (1− )−1
Using the labor supply schedule of asset holders  =  − 11− ( − −1)
and the same production function as in the case with no habits, as well as the goods
market equilibrium condition  =  we obtain:
 =
µ 
1 +  +
1
1− 
¶
 − 
1−  −1
Substituting this into the expression for  found above, and the resulting
expression into the definition of aggregate consumption,  =  + (1− ) 
we obtain consumption of asset holders as a function of current and past aggregate
output (consumption):
 =
∙
1− 
1− 

1 + 
µ
1 +

1 +  (1− )
¶¸
 + 
1− 

1 +  (1− )−1
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The OEE as stated in text is obtained by substituting this in the Euler equation
of asset holders.
Appendix B. The OEE under Non-Separable Preferences
In this Appendix we derive the aggregate OEE for the case of non-separable
preferences consistent with balanced growth:  ( ) =
n
[ (1−)]1− − 1
o
 (1− ) 
where  () OEE a function of leisure 1− and  are hours worked. To simplify
algebra, we assume the functional form for  ():  (1−) = [1−] . Note that
since this in the class of preferences studied by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988),
labor supply of non-asset holders will still be inelastic just as in the separable case
without habits. The loglinearized first-order condition for labor of asset holders
OEE: µ0
 −
00
0
¶
 =  − 
so the constant-consumption elasticity of labor supply will be the inverse of  ≡³
0
 − 
00
0
´
 ; for the simple functional form, 0 = 1− and 
00
0 =
−1
1−  and so
 = 1− is pinned down by steady state hours worked and so:

1−  =  − 
The loglinearized Euler equation is:
+1 −  = 1 [ −+1]−
1− 

0
 [+1 − ]
where for the proposed functional form 0 =  1− = 1Under full participation,
this equation holds for aggregate consumption and hours worked: Basu and Kimball
(2006) estimate it on aggregate data, exploiting that 0 will in equilibrium be
equal to the labor share in consumption and parameterizing this to 0.8. Under
limited participation, we follow the same steps as in the main text to obtain  as
a function of total income/output :
 =
∙
1− 
1− 

1 + 
¸

Substituting this and  = [(1 + ) (1− )]−1  in the Euler equation, we obtain
the aggregate Euler equation:
 = +1 − −1 [ −+1] 
where
 ≡ 
−1
1− 1− 1+ + −1−1(1+)(1−)
The condition for this object to become negative   0 is:
  
−1 + 
1 +  + 
With respect to the separable-utility case, two diﬀerences arise: i.  is pinned down
by steady state hours, so should be between 0.5 and 0.66 (implying a constant-
consumption labor elasticity between 2 and 3); and ii. The presence of −1 (which
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was 1 under separable preferences). Using the more general function  ()  the
condition can be shown to be:
 
µ
1 +
1 +  − −1
1 + + (−1 − 1) ( + )
¶−1

where  ≡ 000  and  +  = 
0
  0
